The Limits of Lon Fuller’s Morality: Revisiting H.L.A. Hart’s Uncelebrated Perspective in Contemporary Legal Discourse
Aqsa Mehak
Ali Akhlaq Khan
Aqsa Mehak & Ali Akhlaq Khan, The Limits of Lon Fuller’s Morality: Revisiting H.L.A. Hart’s Uncelebrated Perspective in Contemporary Legal Discourse, Vol. 12 Iss 1, IJLR (2026)
Abstract
The long-running debate between morality and the law continues to influence legal philosophy, especially in light of the divergent viewpoints of H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. Fuller, a strong supporter of natural law, contends that morality is ingrained in the legal system, particularly through what he refers to as the “internal morality of law”—a body of procedural rules that, in his view, guarantee justice and the integrity of the law. This paper, however, critically analyzes the shortcomings of Fuller's framework in modern settings, contending that an overemphasis on moral principles might weaken the aim of legislation and allow for judicial subjectivity. On the other hand, Fuller's moral optimism frequently eclipses Hart's legal positivism, which provides a more realistic view of the law as a set of regulations separate from moral approval. His approach to penumbral circumstances and his notion of basic and secondary principles show how the law may work logically without always requiring moral justification. Through an analysis of recent Indian court rulings, this study draws attention to the dangers of moral overreach, in which judges have confused legality with arbitrary moral principles, frequently promoting backward ideologies in the name of constitutional principles. In the end, this research uses Hart's “uncelebrated” ideas as a corrective lens to look at the state of the law today. It makes the case for a nuanced jurisprudence, which recognizes the importance of moral principles but forbids them from superseding the objective framework and intent of the law.
Keywords
H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, Legal Positivism, Natural Law Theory, Judicial Moral Overreach.
