No Pocket Veto: Dialogic Federalism and the Constitutional Limits of Gubernatorial Assent

The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion in In Re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills marks a significant development in the constitutional law of gubernatorial assent and Centre–State relations. This article critically examines the Court’s reconstruction of Article 200 as a tripartite mechanism comprising assent, withholding coupled with reconsideration, and reservation for presidential consideration. It argues that this framework is best understood through the concept of dialogic federalism, wherein constitutional organs are expected to engage in structured institutional dialogue rather than exercise unilateral authority. The article evaluates the Court’s rejection of a pocket veto, deemed assent, and judicially prescribed timelines, alongside its recognition of limited judicial scrutiny of prolonged gubernatorial inaction. It further critiques the Court’s approach to gubernatorial discretion under Article 200 and the comparatively expansive non-justiciability accorded to presidential action under Article 201. The article concludes that institutional good faith, rather than judicial substitution, is essential to sustaining responsible government and cooperative federalism.