Anti-Defection Law and the Crisis of Political Morality in India: A Constitutional Appraisal With Comparative Perspectives

The anti-defection law, enshrined in the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India, was introduced to combat political instability and unprincipled party-switching. While it has curbed opportunistic defections and contributed to governmental continuity, it has also significantly altered the constitutional position of legislators by subordinating representative autonomy to party discipline. This article undertakes a doctrinal and comparative constitutional analysis of the anti-defection framework, interrogating its implications for political morality, democratic deliberation, and constitutional accountability. Drawing on comparative insights from the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Bangladesh, the article argues that the Indian model represents one of the most stringent anti-defection regimes globally. The study concludes that while stability is a legitimate constitutional objective, the present structure of the Tenth Schedule generates a crisis of political morality by weakening deliberative democracy and legislative independence. Reform-oriented proposals are offered to reconcile party discipline with constitutional morality.